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Maltreatment increases spontaneous false
memories but decreases suggestion-induced false
memories in children
Henry Otgaar1,2*, Mark L. Howe1,2 and Peter Muris1
1Maastricht University, The Netherlands
2City, University of London, UK
We examined the creation of spontaneous and suggestion-induced false memories in
maltreated and non-maltreated children. Maltreated and non-maltreated children were
involved in a Deese–Roediger–McDermott false memory paradigm where they studied
and remembered negative and neutral word lists. Suggestion-induced false memories
were created using a misinformation procedure during which both maltreated and non-
maltreated children viewed a negative video (i.e., bank robbery) and later received
suggestive misinformation concerning the event. Our results showed that maltreated
children had higher levels of spontaneous negative false memories but lower levels of
suggestion-induced false memories as compared to non-maltreated children. Collec-
tively, our study demonstrates that maltreatment both increases and decreases
susceptibility to memory illusions depending on the type of false memory being
induced.
Statement of contribution
What is already known on this subject?
 Trauma affects memory.
 It is unclear how trauma affects false memory.
What does this study add?
 This study focuses on two types of false memories.
A key issue in legal cases concerns the reliability of testimonies. This is especially
relevant in cases in which forensic technical evidence is lacking and legal decisions
are based solely on testimonies from child witnesses or victims. For example, child
abuse cases are commonly characterized by the presence of children’s statements and
the absence of any other evidence (Brackmann, Otgaar, Sauerland, & Jelicic, 2016;
Howe & Knott, 2015). In such cases, it is of considerable importance to determine the
reliability of children’s eyewitness accounts and decide whether statements about
these events have been contaminated with errors of omission or commission (i.e.,
false memories).
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Many children involved in legal cases have a history of maltreatment. A heated debate
in the memory literature is whether a history of trauma might affect children’s memory,
rendering themmore susceptible to the formation of falsememories.What is important to
consider here is the distinction between falsememories that arise spontaneously (Howe&
Knott, 2015; Otgaar & Candel, 2011), that is, without any external suggestive influence,
and false memories that emerge as the result of suggestive interviewing techniques
(Loftus, 2005). The reason for stressing this distinction is that compared to adults, children
are less likely to form spontaneous falsememories, butmore likely to produce suggestion-
induced false memories (Ceci & Bruck, 1993; but see Otgaar, Howe, Brackmann, &
Smeets, 2016). Furthermore, stressing this issue is important because spontaneous false
memories are more likely to occur because of internal memory mechanisms such as
spreading activation whereas suggestion-induced false memories are often the result of a
mixture of internal and external factors such as compliance (Otgaar et al., 2016). In child
abuse cases, both types of false memories are likely to occur; that is, many of these
children haveprovided statements to different parties, including their parents and friends.
The central question here is whether these spontaneous statements are accurate or
whether they contain errors of commission (false memories). Furthermore, children are
often interviewed by the police or by therapists in forensic settings, and here, there are
opportunities for suggestive interviewing techniques that might infect children’s
statements. In this study, we were interested in maltreated children’s susceptibility to
both spontaneous and suggestion-induced false memories.
Regarding the effects of maltreatment, there are reasons to assume that traumatic
events might adversely affect children’s memory performance. For example, a history of
trauma has been linked to deficits in memory-related brain areas such as reduced
hippocampal volume (Carrion, Haas, Garrett, Song, & Reiss, 2009; Carrion, Weems, &
Reiss, 2007; but see also De Bellis, Hall, Boring, Frustaci, & Moritz, 2001). Also, children
with an abuse experience show more overgeneral memory than neglected or non-
maltreated children (Valentino, Toth, & Cicchetti, 2009). Such examples might fuel the
idea that trauma negatively impacts children’s true memories.
However, there are also studies showing no clear basic memory differences between
traumatized and non-traumatized children (Howe, Cicchetti, & Toth, 2006; McWilliams,
Harris, & Goodman, 2014). One line of work has focused on the effects of trauma on the
formation of children’s spontaneous false memories. For example, studies that have
employed the Deese–Roediger–McDermott (DRM) paradigm (Deese, 1959; Roediger &
McDermott, 1995)have found limited evidence for differences betweenmaltreated andnon-
maltreated children’s true and false memory rates (Howe, Cicchetti, Toth, & Cerrito, 2004).
In the DRM procedure, participants receive associatively related words (e.g., soda, bitter,
pie, heart, good, sugar) that are linked to a non-presented word labelled as the critical lure
(i.e., sweet). The standard finding is that participants falsely recollect the critical lure with
rates often indistinguishable from rates of true memories (Roediger & McDermott, 1995).
The absence of differences in children’s susceptibility to spontaneous false memories
also extends to information that is emotional in nature. For instance, Howe, Toth, and
Cicchetti (2011) found no differences betweenmaltreated and non-maltreated children’s
true and false memory rates for negatively valenced word lists. However, other studies
did find differences when emotionally charged DRM lists are used. Indeed, using
maltreated children whose abuse was so severe that they had been forcibly removed
from their biological parents, such children were more likely to produce negative false
memories than non-maltreated children; that is, Baugerud, Howe, Magnussen, and
Melinder (2016) presented severely maltreated and non-maltreated children (7- to 12-
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year-olds) emotionally negative (e.g., critical lures: violence, dead, scared) and neutral
(e.g., critical lures: man, bed, flower) DRM word lists. The results revealed no
differences between the two groups of children with regard to the level of false
memories elicited by the neutral lists. Interestingly, however, the researchers found that
maltreated children reported significantly higher levels of false memories in relation to
the emotionally negative lists as compared to non-maltreated children. This shows that
maltreatment might increase spontaneous false memories, especially for information
that is emotionally negative in nature. Similar results were obtained by Goodman, Quas,
and Ogle (2009) who also noted that adolescents and adults with a history of child sexual
abuse were more prone to produce emotionally negative false memories than
participants without a documented history of child sexual abuse. A potential mechanism
that might have caused these effects is that traumatized individuals are especially
receptive for emotionally negative stimuli. So, when they are confronted with such
stimuli they are likely to make both correct and incorrect associations, ones that result in
the creation of false memories.
When we focus on trauma and its effect on children’s suggestion-based false memories,
studies seem to show that maltreatment does not lead to increases or decreases in
susceptibility to suggestive pressure in children (Chae, Goodman, Eisen, &Qin, 2011; Eisen,
Goodman, Qin, Davis, & Crayton, 2007). Eisen et al. (2007), for example, tested
susceptibility to suggestive questions in 3- to- 16-year-old maltreated and non-maltreated
childrenwho receivedaphysical examination (i.e., body, genital, andanal) tocollectmedical
evidence for signs of child sexual/physical abuse or neglect. After an interval of 4 days,
children were interviewed about this examination and received open (e.g., ‘What did the
nurse look like?’) and suggestive (‘The nurse didn’t put something tight on your arm, did
she?’) questions. Results basically showed that maltreated children responded in a similar
way to the follow-up questions and thuswere not found to be eithermore or less vulnerable
to suggestive pressure than control children. This dovetails nicely with other work that also
revealed that abuse status did not impact suggestibility levels (Chae et al., 2011).
To recap, although work on maltreated children’s false memory formation is still
somewhat limited, the picture so far seems to be the following. Severe maltreatment
appears to increase children’s susceptibility to emotionally negative spontaneous false
memories but may not influence their susceptibility to suggestion-based false memories.
However, because of this limited evidence, several theoretical and practically relevant
issues need to be resolved. First, all of the studies discussed above only focused on one
specific type of false memory (spontaneous or suggestion-based), and thus, no research
can be found investigating both types within one and the same study. Such an
investigation seems crucial because only in thisway it can be clarifiedwhether an increase
in emotionally negative false memories inmaltreated children goes hand in handwith any
effects on suggestibility. So, the question is whether in maltreated children, susceptibility
to one type of false memory (spontaneous) is related to susceptibility to another type of
false memory (suggestion-based).
An examination of spontaneous and suggestion-based false memories in the same
maltreated children is even more important because there exists debate about the
relationship between different types of false memories and whether these types of false
memories share similar underlying mechanisms (Pezdek & Lam, 2007; Wade et al.,
2007). Work in this area has produced mixed results with some studies showing no
relationship between spontaneous and suggestion-based false memories in children and
adults (Ost, Blank, Davies, Jones, Lambert, & Salmon, 2013) and other studies
demonstrating a positive link between spontaneous false memories and autobiographical
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false memories (Clancy, McNally, Schachter, Lenzenweger, & Pitman, 2002; Otgaar,
Verschuere, Meijer, & vanOorsouw, 2012). Importantly, although theremight be overlap
in the mechanisms underlying spontaneous and suggestion-induced false memories, one
fundamental difference is the following. Spontaneous false memories are exclusively the
result of endogenous processes such as spreading activationwhereas suggestion-induced
false memories are caused by a mixture of both endogenous and exogenous processes
such as external suggestive interviewing techniques. We will examine both types of false
memories in this study. From a forensic perspective, a canonical example is that
maltreated children are repeatedly asked to provide statements and are asked many –
sometimes suggestive – questions, thereby creating an opportunity for both spontaneous
and suggestion-based false memories to occur (Ceci & Bruck, 1993; Howe & Knott,
2015).
In addition, whereas previous studies on false memories in maltreated children have
assessed the occurrence of spontaneous false memories by means of a prototypical
experimental procedure (i.e., the DRM paradigm), suggestion-based false memories have
beenmeasured in a less standardized way. More precisely, in these studies, childrenwere
exposed to a variety of events about which quite different suggestive questions were
asked. It remains unclear to what extent procedures were effective to elicit suggestion-
induced false memories and to study differences between maltreated and non-maltreated
children. A reliable and robust way to produce suggestion-based false memories is the
misinformation paradigm (Loftus, 2005), which surprisingly has not been employed in
previous studies on false memories in maltreated children. In this paradigm, participants
are exposed to an event (e.g., a robbery), presented to them either live or on video. After
this, they receivemisinformation concerning the event (e.g., that the robber was carrying
a knife while in fact he had a gun) often in the form of a narrative. Research has
demonstrated that many participants incorporate this misinformation into their memory
reports, thereby producing false memories (Loftus, 2005).
Another reason for why no differences in false memory propensity for suggestive
questions were detected in previous work is because of the samples used in those
studies; that is, in earlier studies, maltreated children did not have a history of severe
physical/sexual abuse. This is important to consider because Baugerud et al. (2016)
showed that when the sample included children with more several maltreatment
histories, these children evinced higher levels of negative spontaneous false memories.
Hence, in this study, we attempted to test children with a more severe abuse history
(physical and sexual abuse). Many of these children were involved in legal proceedings,
and such cases are only being brought to court when children’s accounts refer to serious
abusive experiences.
In this study, maltreated and non-maltreated children’s false memories were tested
using the DRM paradigm and misinformation paradigm. Specifically, we presented
children with emotionally negative and neutral DRM word lists. Furthermore, during the
misinformation procedure, we presented children with a video concerning a negative
event (i.e., robbery). Based on previous work (Baugerud et al., 2016), our predictions
were that the maltreated children would evince higher levels of spontaneous false
memories especially for emotionally negative words than the non-maltreated children.
Based on previouswork (Chae et al., 2011), our hypothesis regarding suggestion-induced
false memories was that we expected to find that misinformation effects would not differ
between maltreated and non-maltreated children. In addition, we also measured levels of
intelligence and dissociation as previouswork has indicated that these factorsmight affect
children’s memory (Chae et al., 2011).
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Method
Participants
In the current study, 127 4- to 12-year-old children (maltreated: n = 21; mean
age = 8.24 years, SD = 2.28, range 4–11; non-maltreated: n = 106; mean
age = 9.44 years, SD = 1.66, range 6–12) were tested. Maltreated children were
recruited from a forensic child abuse centre (n = 11) and a child interrogation studio
(n = 6), both located in the Netherlands. In the forensic child abuse centre, children
were medically evaluated for signs of sexual and physical abuse. Parents of four
elementary children (mean age = 9.25, SD = 0.96) informed us that their children had a
history of child sexual abuse (see also below). These children were included in the
maltreated sample leading to a total sample of 21 maltreated children. Referrals to this
forensic child abuse centre were from child protection services where the alleged child
sexual abuse was reported. Also, some children who were referred to this centre were
already involved in legal cases and were brought to the centre by the police. Children
who were recruited from the child interrogation centre were all involved in legal cases
concerning sexual abuse. Thus, children from both the forensic centre and the child
interrogation room were referred to those places because it was suspected that they
experienced severe forms of abuse (physical and sexual abuse). Parents or other
caretakers had to provide consent before participation. Children were tested at the
forensic child abuse centre or at their homes in separate quiet rooms. Twenty-nine per
cent (n = 7) of the parents reported to have a below average income, and 14% (n = 3)
reported to have an average or above-average income. We did not receive any
information regarding the income of the other parents. Children received a small present
for their participation in the study.
The non-maltreated children were recruited from elementary schools in middle-class
areas in the Netherlands. The parents of these children also provided parental consent
before participation. The schools consisted of children with parents having average
income. Children were tested in separate rooms at their school. Similar to the maltreated
children, these non-maltreated children received a present for their participation. The
study was approved by the ethical committee of the Faculty of Psychology and
Neuroscience, Maastricht University.
Materials
Dissociative Experiences Scale for Adolescents
For exploratory reasons, we included the Dissociative Experiences Scale for Adolescents
(A-DES; Armstrong, Putnam, Carlson, Libero, & Smith, 1997). The A-DES is a self-report
measure of dissociation commonly used for 11-year-old children and older. It contains 30
items describing dissociative experiences (‘Something inside of me seems to makeme do
things that I don’t want to do’) using 11-point scales (0 = never to 10 = always). The A-
DES has high reliability, internal validity, and discriminant validity (Armstrong et al.,
1997).
Wechsler Intelligence Scale for Children
We used the third version of the Wechsler Intelligence Scale for Children (WISC)
(Wechsler, 1991) to estimate children’s level of intelligence. Specifically, the Vocabulary
and Block Design subtests were administered, which have high correlations with the
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WISC-III full-scale scores. Norm scores were calculated for the present experiment. An
estimate of the total IQ was derived using the norm scores of the Vocabulary and Block
Design subtests (Wechsler, 1991).
Trauma history
To provide some objective information on children’s history of trauma, we presented
children’s parents or caretakers with an adapted version of the Childhood Trauma
Questionnaire-Short Form (CTQ-SF; Bernstein & Fink, 1998; Thombs, Bernstein,
Lobbestael, & Arntz, 2009). The CTQ-SF is a 28-item self-report questionnaire that
measures multiple dimensions of childhood maltreatment: Physical abuse, emotional
abuse, sexual abuse, physical neglect, emotional neglect, and minimization/denial. Each
dimension contains five items except the minimization/denial scale that comprises three
items. Items are scored from 1 (never true) to 5 (very often true). Originally, the CTQ-SF is
a self-report questionnaire, but for the purpose of this study, items were rephrased from
the perspective of the child. Thus, an item of the original version such as: ‘When I was
growing up, I didn’t have enough to eat’ was changed into ‘When (s)he was growing up,
(s)he didn’t have enough to eat’.
DRM paradigm
We used five neutral (critical lures: bread, smoke, window, foot, sweet) and five negative
(critical lures: murder, punishment, cry, death, pain) 10-word DRM lists in this
experiment. An example of a negative DRM list was as follows: tears, sorrow, laugh,
whine, baby, scream, roar, whining, wet, weep, which referred to the critical lure ‘cry’.
These DRM lists have been used in previous research and are effective in generating
spontaneous false memories (Otgaar et al., 2016). The DRM recognition task contained
78 words including 40 correct items (e.g., butter, tears), 10 critical lures, 10 non-
presented related items (e.g., deceased, syrup), and 18 non-presented unrelated items
(e.g., rock, bus). The recognition task was audiotaped and was presented at a rate of 5-
second per item. We calculated hit rates (correct responses divided by total possible
correct items [=40]) and false alarm rates (e.g., for critical lures: false responses divided by
total number of critical lures [=10]).
Misinformation paradigm
We presented children with a negatively laden video of a bank robbery. This video had
already been successfully used in previous research (Otgaar et al., 2016). Misinformation
waspresented in the formof an eyewitness account,whichwas audiotaped andpresented
to the children. In the account, the eyewitness suggested five incorrect details that were
not shown in the video (i.e., pistol, money, laptop, brochures, ticket-dispenser) and 20
correct details that were really presented during the video. The recognition task was
composed of 50 items consisting of the five incorrect details and 20 correct details, five
related but not-presented items, and 20 unrelated but not-presented items. Items were
presented at a 5-second rate, and responses were recorded by the experimenter. We
calculated hit rates (correct responses divided by total possible correct items [=20]) and
false alarm rates (e.g., for incorrect items: false responses divided by total number of
critical lures [=5]).
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Design and procedure
This study involved a between-subjects design with maltreated versus non-maltreated
children as our independent variable. For the DRM paradigm, we also had a within-
subjects factor in that children received both negative and neutral DRM lists. The order of
the lists was counterbalanced. Furthermore, it was also counterbalanced whether
children first received the DRM paradigm or the misinformation paradigm.
After parents/caretakers provided consent, theywere given the adapted version of the
CTQ-SF. During the DRM procedure, children listened to the word lists which were
presented to them bymeans of a headphone. After the presentation of the lists, a 3-minute
filler task was provided to the children (i.e., find the differences). Then, the recognition
task of the DRM task was administered. During the misinformation paradigm, children
were first presented with the video, which was displayed by means of a laptop using
headphones for sound. Following this, there was again a 3-minute filler task (Find the
differences), after which children received the misinformation by listening to the
eyewitness account via headphone. Next, children engaged in a third and final 3-minute
filler task (Find the Differences). After this, children received the recognition task of the
video. Subsequently, children had to fill in the A-DES. When children did not (fully)
understand certain items of this questionnaire, the experimenter gave them additional
explanation. This was especially relevant for younger children as the A-DES is originally
designed for children aged 11 years and above. After the extra clarification, all children
were able to complete the A-DES (with or without help of the experimenter). Finally,
children were presented with the Vocabulary and Block Design subtests of the WISC.
Results
Preliminary analysis
To obtain a more objective estimate of the maltreatment status of our sample, we first
examined the scores on the CTQ-SF between themaltreated and non-maltreated children.
As expected, using independent-samples t-tests, on all scales, except for emotional and
physical neglect, parents/caretakers of maltreated children provided higher trauma-
related scores than the parents/caregivers of non-maltreated children (Table 1). We also
examined whether IQ scores differed between the two groups. Although the IQ scores of
children in both groups fell within the average range, an independent-samples t-test
showed that the mean IQ score was statistically higher for children in the non-maltreated
group (M = 109.11, SD = 12.65) than for those in the maltreated group, M = 92.61,
SD = 14.80, t(124) = 5.21, p < .001, Cohen’s d = 1.20.
DRM task
Hit rates
As dissociation and intelligence have been shown to affect children’s memory (Chae
et al., 2011), theywere included as covariates in our statistical analyses. Also, because the
age range was quite broad in our sample, we incorporated age as a covariate as well. As is
customary in developmental research on (spontaneous) false memories, scores were
corrected for possible response bias, a correction that leads to purer measures of hits and
falsememory (Otgaar et al., 2016). Tobemoreprecise, scoreswere transformedusing the
following two-high threshold correction (H  FA(U)) in which H is the hit rate for
presented items and FA(U) refers to false alarms of non-presented unrelated items
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(Snodgrass & Corwin, 1988). False alarms for critical items were also transformed using
(FA(CL)  FA(U)) where FA(CL) refers to false alarms for critical items. Finally, we
corrected false alarms for related items using (FA(R)  FA(U)) where FA(R) is the false
alarm rate for non-presented related items. This correction was applied for memory types
of both the DRM and misinformation paradigms.
A 2 (Group: maltreated vs. non-maltreated) 9 2 (Emotion: negative vs. neutral)
ANCOVA with the last factor being a repeated measure was conducted on the corrected
hit rates (Table 2). Thiswas done to examine the effects of trauma on correct recognition.
The covariates dissociation and intelligence scores did not have statistical effects on the
hit rates (ps > .05). Age as a covariate did have a statistical effect on hit rates (p < .001)
with children having higher scoreswhen getting older. Neither themain effects of Group,
F(1, 118) = 1.39, p = .24, g2p = .01, and Emotion, F(1, 118) = 0.01, p = .92, g
2
p = .00,
Table 1. Childhood Trauma Questionnaire scores between the maltreated and non-maltreated group
Group Mean (SD) p-value Cohen’s d
Emotional abuse Non-maltreated 6.28 (1.71) <.001 1.20
Maltreated 10.62 (4.80)
Physical abuse Non-maltreated 5.34 (1.01) <.001 0.78
Maltreated 7.33 (3.44)
Sexual abuse Non-maltreated 5.10 (0.37) <.001 0.92
Maltreated 9.50 (6.73)
Emotional neglect Non-maltreated 8.78 (3.50) .42 0.19
Maltreated 9.50 (4.22)
Physical neglect Non-maltreated 6.21 (1.82) .16 0.32
Maltreated 6.86 (2.26)
Minimization Non-maltreated 3.00 (.00) <.001 5.16
Maltreated 0.41 (.71)
Note. Except for minimization, higher scores indicate higher levels of trauma.
Table 2. DRM-corrected memory scores in maltreated and non-maltreated children
Group Mean (SD)
Hit rates neutral Non-maltreated .39 (.23)
Maltreated .28 (.28)
Hit rates negative Non-maltreated .49 (.21)
Maltreated .37 (.25)
Critical lures neutral Non-maltreated .38 (.29)
Maltreated .28 (.35)
Critical lures negative Non-maltreated .51 (.25)
Maltreated .38 (.30)
Related items neutral Non-maltreated .06 (.16)
Maltreated .13 (.22)
Related items negative Non-maltreated .03 (.16)
Maltreated .14 (.20)
Note. Because these scores are corrected, values can become negative.
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nor the interaction of Group and Emotion attained statistical significance,
F(1, 118) = 0.00, p = .97, g2p = .00.
False memories (spontaneous)
Whenweconducted a repeated-measures ANCOVAon the corrected falsememory scores
for the critical lures, no statistical effects emerged (ps > .12). However, whenwe focused
on false memories for related items, we found a statistically significant interaction,
F(1, 118) = 14.43, p < .001, g2p = .11. As predicted, there were no differences for the
neutral lists (p = .07), but simple effects analyses for the negative lists showed that
maltreated children (M = .14, SD = .20) evinced higher levels of spontaneous false
memories than non-maltreated children (M = .03, SD = .16. p = .02; Table 2). A Bayesian
analysis identified a Bayes factor (BF; 10) of 4.70, indicating more evidence for the
alternative (more negative false memories in maltreated than in non-maltreated children)
than the null hypothesis. In this analysis, none of the covariateswas statistically significant
(all ps > .05).
Misinformation task
Hit rates
Because the assumption of homogeneity of varianceswas violated, the datawere analysed
using a Mann–Whitney U-test. Our analysis showed that maltreated children (mean
rank = 36.58) had statistically lower hit rates than non-maltreated children (mean
rank = 68.58;U = 521.50, z = 3.62, p < .001, r = .32). A BF (10) > 1,000was found.
False memories (suggestion-induced)
A similar analysis showed that suggestion-induced false memories were less likely to
emerge in maltreated (mean rank = 48.75) than in non-maltreated children (mean
rank = 66.28; U = 765.00, z = 2.02, p = .04, r = .18; Figure 1). We also found a BF
(10) of 717.80. We also looked at false alarms for related items. For this analysis, the
homogeneity of variances assumption was not violated. Using an ANCOVA with
dissociation, intelligence, and age as covariates, we found a main effect of Group,
F(1, 119) = 4.27, p = .04, g2p = .04. Like our suggestion-induced false memory data, we
found that false memory levels for related items were statistically lower in the maltreated
(M = 0.10, SD = 0.14) than in the non-maltreated children (M = 0.16, SD = 0.14; see
Table 3 for the corrected scores). A BF (10) of 3.66was detected. The covariates were not
statistically significant (ps > .15).
Exploratory analyses
Although we controlled for age in all our analyses where possible, two issues in our data
need extra attention. First, the mean age between the maltreated and non-maltreated
differed statistically from each other, t(125) = 2.85, p = .005, Cohen’s d = .60. Second,
we tested far more control (n = 106) than maltreated children (n = 21). To deal with
these issues, we explored the effects of maltreatment on false memory by comparing our
maltreated sample with a non-maltreated sample that was matched by age. This was done
by excluding children aged 9 or older from the non-maltreated sample. This resulted in a
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non-maltreated sample consisting of 38 children (mean age = 7.55, SD = 0.55), which
importantly no longer statistically differed from the maltreated children in terms of age,
t(57) = 1.77, p = .082, Cohen’s d = .42.
When we focused on the impact of maltreatment on DRM false memories for critical
lures, we only found that negative false recall (M = 0.37, SD = 0.26) was statistically
higher than neutral false recall,M = 0.21, SD = 0.30;F(1, 55) = 9.34,p = .003,g2p = .15.
In line with what we found earlier, for the related items, we found that only the negative
false memories were statistically higher in the maltreated (M = 0.12, SD = 0.20) than in
non-maltreated children, M = 0.00, SD = 0.17; F(1, 55) = 7.16, p = .010, g2p = .12.
Regarding the misinformation false memories, we found false memory levels again to be
lower in maltreated (M = 0.47, SD = 0.38) than in non-maltreated children, M = 0.61,
SD = 0.21; t(56) = 1.89, p = .06, Cohen’s d = .46, albeit that this difference was not
staistically significant. Further, we found that maltreated children (M = 0.07, SD = 0.16)
had statistically lower false memory rates for related items than non-maltreated children,
M = 0.18, SD = 0.16; t(56) = 2.44, p = .02, Cohen’s d = .69.
We also explored whether spontaneous false memories were related to suggestion-
induced false memories. However, we did not find any significant correlations between
these two types of false memories (all ps > .21).
Discussion
We were interested in the effects of maltreatment on children’s spontaneous and
suggestion-induced false memories. The results of the current study can be catalogued
as follows. For spontaneous false memories, we found that maltreatment was
associated with higher rates of negative false memories for related items. However, for
Figure 1. Mean rank suggestion-induced false memories as a function of maltreatment.
Table 3. Corrected scores (means and standard deviations) of the misinformation task for children in
the maltreated and non-maltreated group
Maltreated Non-maltreated
Hit rates 0.45 (0.30) 0.68 (0.12)
False memory 0.47 (0.38) 0.67 (0.24)
False memory for related items 0.07 (0.16) 0.16 (0.14)
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false memories induced by misinformation, the reverse was true. Here, we found that
maltreated children were less susceptible to suggestion-based false memories than
non-maltreated children. To our knowledge, this study represents the first empirical
attempt to examine maltreatment effects on different types of children’s false
memories.
Our finding that negative spontaneous false memories for related items were more
easily evoked in maltreated than in non-maltreated children is in line with some of the
earlier work on this topic (Baugerud et al., 2016; Goodman et al., 2009). Those studies
also showed thatmaltreatmentwas associatedwith higher falsememory rates for negative
DRM lists. The reason for the increased rates of negative false memories in (severely)
maltreated children may have to do with the fact that such children are particularly
sensitive and responsive to emotional stimuli; that is, maltreated children are often
exposed to multiple and chronic forms of abuse that might deteriorate their general
memory performance and theway they handle emotional experiences (Beers & De Bellis,
2002). Studies have shown that maltreated children have problems with emotion
regulation and display increased arousal levels (Kim & Cicchetti, 2009). As studies show
that false memories increase as arousal levels become elevated (Howe, Toth, & Cicchetti,
2006),maltreated childrenmight bemore prone to automatically activate related but non-
presented negative information in memory during encoding. In addition, these children
might be subject to more failures in monitoring differences between negative true and
false information during retrieval, something that would also lead to heightened
spontaneous false memory levels.
It must be said that these former studies found that maltreatment affected false
memories for critical lures (Baugerud et al., 2016), whereas our study only found
support for maltreatment effects on false memories for related items. Of course,
although our findings are to some extent consistent with earlier work, our study and the
previous ones differ on some critical points. To begin with, in the study by Baugerud and
colleagues, recall measures were used whereas we assessed recognition. It is especially
important when studying the effects of emotion on false memories, that the method
used to measure memory (recall or recognition) is taken into account; that is, studies
have shown mixed effects depending on whether recall or recognition tests are used
(Howe, Candel, Otgaar, Malone, & Wimmer, 2010). For example, research generally
shows that false recall is frequently higher for neutral than for negative lists, whereas the
opposite is found when using recognition tests. Furthermore, in the maltreated sample
in Baugerud et al.’s study, children had been subjected to a mixture of different types of
abuse such as physical/sexual abuse and neglect. In our study, sexual abuse was most
likely to have played a role, while there was no obvious evidence for issues of neglect.
This is important because research suggests that different types of trauma might have
differential effects on memory (Chae et al., 2011). It is certainly possible that both the
use of different memory measures and somewhat different trauma samples might have
contributed to the slightly different false memory outcomes between Baugerud et al.’s
study and the present investigation. Furthermore, research in the area of the effects of
trauma on false memory is still scarce and so far results have been quite inconsistent; that
is, some studies have not found trauma to impact (negative) spontaneous false memories
(Howe et al., 2004, 2011) while others have found trauma to affect (negative)
spontaneous false memories (Baugerud et al., 2016; Goodman, Ogle, Block, & Harris,
2011). These different results could be due to a variety of reasons, such as the use of
different DRM lists or sample characteristics (i.e., adolescents and adults vs. children;
Goodman et al., 2011). All in all, the fact that we did not find trauma to effect false
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memory for critical lures is not a completely out of line with prior research. What it does
suggest is that considerably more research needs to conducted in order to better specify
the effects of trauma on children’s true and false memory.
Contrary to our expectations, we found that maltreated children were less prone to
accept suggestive information than non-maltreated children.We found this result for both
false alarms and related items. This is a hitherto unreported finding. Previous work has
found that maltreated and non-maltreated children did not differ with respect to their
levels of suggestibility (Eisen et al., 2007). It is unclear why the present results deviate
from those obtained inpreviouswork.However, itmust be emphasized that our studywas
the first to employ a standardizedway (i.e., misinformation paradigm) to elicit suggestion-
induced false memories. In previous research, children were involved in different events
and received different questions by different experimenters. However, we used a well-
controlled and often-used procedure (i.e., the misinformation paradigm; Loftus, 2005) to
foster suggestion-induced false memories in children.
Furthermore, the reason for decreased misinformation effects in maltreated children
might be that these children also had lower hit rates than non-maltreated children. This is
relevant because the incorrect details (e.g., pistol) that werementioned in the eyewitness
testimony were associatively related to the details presented in the video (e.g., robber).
There is a wealth of studies showing that false memories are caused by associative
activation (Howe, Wimmer, Gagnon, & Plumpton, 2009; Otgaar et al., 2016). Because
maltreated children had lower hit rates in the misinformation task than non-maltreated
children, there were fewer opportunities to associatively activate related, but false,
details, thereby leading to reduced suggestion-induced falsememory effects inmaltreated
children. It should be stressed here that the lower hit rates of maltreated children were
only evident in themisinformation task andnot in theDRM task.Hence, our reasoning that
maltreated children were less able to automatically activate related details than non-
maltreated children only applies to our findings of the misinformation task and does not
imply that traumatized children have a general deficit in using spreading activation. Of
course, future studies should attempt to replicate this finding and examine whether
standardized methods to induce suggestion-induced false memories might indeed lead to
reduced false memories in maltreated children. Attempting to replicate this finding is all
the more relevant because when our data were matched by age, we only found on a
descriptive level that misinformation effects were lower in the maltreated than non-
maltreated children (p = .06).
Our study is the first to have combined procedures to elicit both spontaneous and
suggestion-induced false memories. Previous work in this field has only focused on one
type of false memory or did not use the standard experimental procedure used to elicit
these different false memories. For example, in Chae et al.’s (2011) and Eisen et al.’s
(2007) studies, children’s susceptibility to suggestive questions was examined, but also
commission errors to non-suggestive questions were measured. One might posit that the
latter category could be regarded as a form of spontaneous false memory. The crucial
problem with this interpretation is that it is not clear whether these commission errors
reflect responses purely based on ‘memory’ or whether they reflect a response bias
(Brainerd, Reyna, & Ceci, 2008). Therefore, the DRM procedure is frequently employed
because it has been specifically designed to tap into memory mechanisms, such as
spreading activation, that might result in the creation of spontaneous false memories.
There are also some caveats of the present study that need to be discussed. First of all,
our non-maltreated sample was much larger and on average somewhat older than the
maltreated sample. Todealwith these issues,wecontrolled for age in our analyses and also
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conducted an additional analysis in which we made an attempt to match maltreated and
non-maltreated children. On both occasions, we found evidence to suggest that
maltreatment increased negative spontaneous false memories, but decreased sugges-
tion-induced false memories. Still, future research in this area would benefit from
including more matched groups of maltreated and non-maltreated children.
Second, our conclusions might be seen as tentative because of the small sample size
of maltreated children. Related to this is that our maltreated group mainly consisted of
children being referred to child interrogation rooms or a forensic child abuse centre.
Such children are only referred to such places if there are serious indications for severe
physical and sexual abuse. Of course, a recurrent shortcoming in studies like ours is that
the abusive claims are not substantiated. Third, in the current study, we sometimes had
to use materials unsuitable for young children (A-DES, WISC).1 This is particularly true
for the A-DES, which is normally used in children aged 11 and above and thus may
contain items that were not fully understood by the young participants in our sample.
But is also applies to the WISC, which has a lower age limit of 6 years, although the
subtests Block Design and Vocabulary are included in the preschool version of this test
(Wechsler, 1989). Of course, prospective work in this area should include develop-
mentally appropriate measures. Fourth, one might argue that our results have limited
practical value because our experiment focused on recognition measures. However, in
DRM research, although it is true that for some findings (e.g., the effect of emotion on
false memory) recall and recognition results can differ, for other findings (e.g.,
developmental increases in false memories) the results are the same for recall and
recognition (Brainerd et al., 2008). Furthermore, in legal contexts, it is known that
children are often not asked open-ended recall questions, but are interviewed using
closed questions such as the ones we used in our recognition tasks (e.g., ‘Do you
remember that your father touched you on your buttocks?’). Also, our results might have
limited generalizability because our memory test was done in one test session while
children in legal cases are often asked about their memories after long delays. However,
one might still expect that when longer delays are used that our results would still hold.
The reasoning behind this is that memory performance deteriorates after passage of time
and that people tend to rely more on meaning when remembering, making false
memories more likely to occur. Furthermore, research shows that emotionally negative
false memories are more likely to occur after a delay (Howe et al., 2010) which would
mean that, especially for maltreated children, negative false memories are more likely to
arise after the passage of time.
Another possible limitation is that our differences in eliciting spontaneous and
suggestion-induced falsememories betweenmaltreated and non-maltreated children (i.e.,
increases and decreases in false memory) are an artefact of the type of procedure that was
used. Of course, our tasks used to induce false memories were quite different from each
other and so, ideally the same material should be used to elicit both types of false
memories. For example,word listswere used to elicit spontaneous falsememorieswhile a
video and misinformation was used to elicit suggestion-induced false memories. So, one
1 The A-DES and theWISC are not suitable for use with very young children such as 4- or 5-year-olds. However, the forensic child
abuse institute only approved that we used the materials as included in the present study and hence, other materials could not be
added. To circumvent this issue, we made sure that when young children received the A-DES or theWISC, the research assistant
sat next to the children to explain the items of the tests and assist them in completing thesemeasures. For example, for the A-DES,
after each item, children were asked before the rating whether they understood the item. If not, the research assistant explained
the item, after which they were asked once more if they understood the item. If they did not, they did not complete the rating for
that particular item.
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could argue that our results merely show that maltreated children are less likely to form
negative false memories for word lists than non-maltreated children whereas this
difference changes when procedures (e.g., misinformation paradigm) involving more
emotionally arousing and complex life events are employed. However, this argument falls
short for the following reasons. First, research has shown that emotionalword lists such as
the ones used in the DRMparadigm evoke emotional reactions that are quite similar to the
ones produced by complex real-life events and autobiographical memories (Rubin &
Talarico, 2009). Second, although there is debate about whether different false memories
share similar underlying mechanisms (Ost et al., 2013; Otgaar & Candel, 2011), there is
some evidence showing that DRM false memories are positively related to (false)
autobiographical memories (Clancy et al., 2002). However, in the current study, we did
not find evidence for a relationship between suggestion-induced false memories and
spontaneous falsememorieswhich implies differentmechanisms probably underlie these
different types of false memories. The implication of this could be that laboratory tasks
that induce false memories are not likely to be directly generalized to false memories
occurring in daily life (e.g., during suggestive police interviews). Nonetheless, apart from
the question about whether different false memories share similar mechanisms, in the
legal arena, spontaneous false memories and suggestion-induced false memories are both
relevant. Children involved in legal proceedings oftentimes provide testimony sponta-
neously while also being asked (suggestive) questions by interviewers (BLINDED). As the
DRM andmisinformation paradigms have been constructed to mimic such situations, our
findings could be of definite legal relevance.
To recap, in the present study, we examined the effects of maltreatment on children’s
spontaneous and suggestion-induced false memories. Our study extends previous work
related to the debate on the effects of trauma on memory. Our new angle in this debate is
that our results suggest that trauma does affect memory, but in a rather complex and
unique way. Although there is research showing that trauma does not impact memory
functioning (McWilliams et al., 2014), we found that maltreated children were more
susceptible to negative false memories than non-maltreated children. In contrast, we also
showed that misinformation effects were less pronounced in maltreated than in non-
maltreated children. This study shows that maltreatment might have varying complex
effects on false memories depending on their type (spontaneous vs. suggested) adding to
the accumulating evidence that the effects of maltreatment on memory can be both
positive and negative.
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